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Why do presidents, when facing the same circumstances, focus on different threats to national
security? Enemies of the American Way  attempts to answer this question by investigating the
role of identity in presidential decision making. The book explains why presidents disagree on
what constitutes a threat to the US security via the study of three US presidencies in the 19th
century (Cleveland, Harrison, and McKinley). Paul Brighton values the author ’s contribution
for reminding us of how individual presidents’ own preconceptions shape global foreign policy. 
Enemies of the American Way: Identity and Presidential Foreign
Policymaking. David Bell Mislan. Continuum. July 2012.
Remember George W. Bush’s “Axis of  Evil”? It seems a long time ago: and
yet the issue of  how we def ine our enemies, and the nature of  the threat
they pose, remains a live issue. And although President Obama
articulates matters very dif f erently f rom his immediate predecessor, much
of  the post-election commentary has f ocused on the nature and extent
of  the threats posed by countries like Iran, North Korea – not to mention
Syria and China, f or largely or entirely dif f erent reasons.
David Bell Mislan’s Enemies of the American Way attempts to approach
the problem of  def ining international threats through two contrasting
methods: by attempting to f it it  within a number of  theoretical
f rameworks, and by studying three presidents f rom over a century ago.
Grover Cleveland was the only President to serve two non-consecutive
terms. He broke a long Republican stranglehold on the White House in
1884 to become the f irst elected Democrat since Buchanan bef ore the Civil War. He then lost his bid f or a
second term to Republican Benjamin Harrison, whose grandf ather, William, had also been President, though
only f or a month. Harrison, in turn, lost his bid f or re-election to a resurgent Grover Cleveland, who went
on to serve a f ull second term. In 1896, William McKinley reclaimed the White House f or the Republicans,
winning again in 1900, both times at the expense of  the populist agrarian Democrat William Jennings Bryan.
McKinley, however, was assassinated in September 1901, just six months into his second term. (Not, as
Mislan states, in February, bef ore it even started). It is at this stage that the period embraced by the book
ends, leaving the colourf ul Theodore Roosevelt years still ahead.
Mislan has two approaches. First he gives us an occasionally slightly laboured identif ication of  theoretical
f rameworks. First there is balance of  threat theory (of f ensive capability/of f ensive intentions, etc.). Then
domestic polit ics and sectional interests (House and Senate/perceived “national interest”, etc.). Social
Identity theory (individual identif ication with membership of  social groups is then applied. But f inally, Rule-
Based Identity comes to the rescue, and provides a template that satisf ies Mislan. The answer, it turns out,
is “identity salience”, or “”the def init ion of  the self  in terms of  group membership shared with other people”.
This means that Rule-Based Identity is more likely to mean that Americans regard themselves not so much
as “Americans” as, f or instance, “baseball-playing Americans”. “What matters f or the survival of  group
identity, and the identif ication of  threat, depends on how a group identif ies itself .”
Which is all very interesting, but where do Presidents Cleveland, Harrison and McKinley come in? You never
thought you’d be so pleased to welcome back these three long-dead leaders; but, af ter the theory, it ’s a
posit ive pleasure to get down to brass tacks with them.
Cleveland’s threats were the Brit ish, the Germans and the Spanish: but always by proxy. There was never
any question of  the USA f acing a head-on conf lict with them. It was all vicarious: Britain over Canada and
then over Venezuela; Germany over Samoa; and, notoriously, Spain over Cuba. This last, of  course, the
occasion of  Hearst’s f amous dictum to the ef f ect that his staf f  must f urnish the pictures: he’d f urnish the
war! For Cleveland, Mislan argues, Americans were rugged individualists, humble, f aithf ul, hard- working and,
above all, just. It was all the f ault of  other international rascals who had not the same high standards:
Cleveland was otherwise happy to let sleeping dogs lie.
Harrison was also an essentially peaceable President. However, he too had his standards, and his sense of
high national self -esteem made it hard f or him to put up with perf idious Albion’s past support of  the
Conf ederates in the Civil War. (The support was not, of  course, unanimous, but it was extensive, and
across parties). Ironically, Harrison, who admired much of  Britain’s polit ical culture, regarded the
quintessential late-Victorian Prime Minister Lord Salisbury as one of  the most predatory f igures on the
world stage.
Harrison’s Americans were exceptional because of  their unique polity and system of  government. America’s
history, self -determination and civic-mindedness made the country and its people inherently superior. So,
f or Harrison, the attempt to take over Hawaii was not out of  a sense of  aggression or expansionism: it
was simply his knowledge that they would be so much better of f ; and they would be protected f rom the
terrible prospect of  rule by Germany, France, Britain or Italy – between whom he scarcely distinguished.
For McKinley, Harrison’s f ellow-Republican, the perception was similar: but, because he lived in slightly more
turbulent t imes, he was enraged by the contrast between America’s humanity and the inhumanity of  the rest.
That, essentially, was the reason f or the intervention against the Spanish in Cuba in the 1890s. Unlike
Harrison, McKinley never saw the Brit ish as a real threat, and studiously avoided taking a high moral tone
over the Boer War. He was happy to counter what he saw as German aggression over the Philippines and
Spanish action in Cuba. However, there were no permanent threats and enemies: just individual responses
on merit.
Enemies of the American Way is at its best in dealing with specif ic historical events. When Mislan returns to
his theoretical f rameworks and applies them to directly to the events of  these “Gilded Age” presidencies,
the ef f ect can f eel laboured: the results either already apparent f rom what has been recounted, or resting
on too litt le data f or them to have any more general applicability. However, he has done a service in
reminding us how important individual presidents’ own preconceptions and mindsets were then and still are
now in shaping global f oreign policy.
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